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In the dark of night on 24-25 July 1943 a platoon of Canadian infantry sits 
quietly on the second of three Axis-
dominated ridges between the Sicilian 
towns of Nissoria and Agira. Engines 
noises break the silence of the night 
as three personnel transports roll up 
the highway between the towns. A 
finger tightens on the trigger of a Bren 
gun and bullets tear into the vehicles. 
Steady fire pours from the bushes 
and grenades splinter amongst the 
enemy soldiers. The night briefly 
returns to quiet before two more 
transports grind into view and 
again a finger tightens on the trigger 
of a Bren gun. These Axis troops 
were moving west to help stop the 
Canadian advance on Agira. Existing 
accounts assert that 2nd Battalion 
104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment 
held these ridges and defeated 1st 
Canadian Infantry Brigade (1 CIB), 
yet this incident casts a different light 
on the situation. The 2nd Battalion 
actually formed the nucleus of a 
much larger force composed of many 
German and Italian units, all of which 
had to receive desperately needed 
reinforcements during battle, after 1 
CIB hammered their lines in the first 
two days of the Canadian advance. 
 On 10 July 1943 the Allies 
launched Operation Husky, the 
invasion of Axis-held Sicily. Part 
of a grand strategy set at the 
Casablanca Conference in January, 
the undertaking was designed to 
erode German combat strength 
and help facilitate a cross-channel 
invasion of occupied France in 1944. 
Included in the operation was Major-
General Guy Simonds’ 1st Canadian 
Infantry Division (1 CID) which 
fought through the island’s rugged 
interior, unhinging the Axis’ main 
line of resistance. Vital to enemy 
defences, the town of Agira in central 
Sicily controlled the roads and terrain 
ahead of 1 CID’s eastward advance. 
 As the campaign began the 
Canadians formed the inland left flank 
of General Bernard Montgomery’s 
British Eighth Army, which attacked 
northward along the east coast 
toward the city of Messina, adjacent 
to the straits bearing the same 
name.1 The British raced north to the 
Catania Plains, a place historian Carlo 
D’Este contends quickly became “the 
most critical objective in Sicily.” A 
breakthrough would leave Axis 
formations “vulnerable to a double 
envelopment from east and west.”2 
As Germans poured into the region, 
British mobility waned. 
 Accordingly, 1 CID was ordered 
to penetrate the mountainous interior 
of central Sicily, pivot east and roll 
enemy defences toward the Catania 
Plains. Having already pushed 50 
miles inland to Giarratana, on the 
night of 14-15 July 1 CID resumed 
its advance. The division moved 
northwest and dispatched German 
units attempting to hold transport 
junctions at Grammichele, Piazza 
Armerina and Valguarnera. By the 
evening of 22 July the Canadians 
consolidated on the lynchpin of Axis 
defences in Sicily: the Leonforte-
Assoro massif. The Germans had 
enjoyed the luxury of fighting when 
and where they decided but now the 
enemy “dare not retire by bounds, 
nor could they risk manoeuvres; 
they were obliged to fight where they 
stood.”3  
 While 1 CID captured Leonforte-
Assoro Montgomery conceded that 
his army could not immediately 
penetrate the Catania Plains lest 
he incur tremendous casualties. 
On 21 July, he ordered his three 
British divisions to assume an 
aggressive defence while 1 CID 
continued “without restraint” toward 
Adrano, to break the enemy’s lateral 
communications south of Mount Etna 
and hurry the collapse of the entire 
front. As a preliminary step, Major-
General Simonds ordered 1 CID to 
capture Agira.4 
 Meanwhile, Brigadier Roy E. 
Urquhart’s 231st Malta Brigade (231 
MB) moved from Raddusa on 19 
July to positions three miles south of 
Agira. On 20 July the brigade came 
Abstract: From 24-28 July 1943, 1st 
Canadian Infantry Division attacked 
Axis forces deeply entrenched on three 
large ridges that stood between the 
Sicilian towns of Nissoria and Agira. To 
date, historians have suggested that 
1st Canadian Infantry Brigade (1 CIB) 
failed in its attempt to unseat a small 
German delay force which guarded the 
ridges and Agira. However, the area 
was actually a formidable defensive 
position manned by many German and 
Italian units that were supported by 
armour and artillery, and continuously 
reinforced throughout the battle. By 
destroying enemy men and equipment 
and eroding morale, 1 CIB set the stage 
for the capture of Agira by 2nd Canadian 
Infantry Brigade. 
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under Simonds’ command and was 
ordered to hold until the Canadians 
consolidated Leonforte-Assoro 
and reached ground immediately 
west of Agira. On 20-21 July the 
Dorsetshire Regiment (Dorsets) 
probed 2nd Battalion 34th Italian 
Infantry Regiment, which guarded 
Agira together with elements of 
the Hermann Göring Division. 
Southwest, the Devonshire Regiment 
(Devons) discovered men from 15th 
Regiment 29th Panzer Grenadier 
Division.5 With the terrain well 
registered by enemy guns and the 
town heavily defended, the British 
formation needed a firm base for their 
operation.
 On 21 July, 3rd Canadian Infantry 
Brigade (3 CIB) arrived to support 231 
MB near the Dittaino River. The next 
day the West Nova Scotia Regiment 
(WNSR) situated itself near the town 
of Libertinia. The Carleton and York 
Regiment deployed over territory 
from a crossing near Raddusa-Agira 
Station to an area three miles north of 
the dried watercourse and the Royal 
22e Régiment dug in to the south.6 
Meanwhile, preparations for the 
main attack continued.
 As the crow flies, Agira is eight 
miles from Leonforte and it was 
estimated that delaying forces 
might resist in between. Experience 
showed the enemy preferred to 
defend mountaintop towns, and 
“because it was overlooked from the 
high ground to west and east” the 
small town of Nissoria positioned 
en route seemed unsuitable.7 On 22 
July, Simonds ordered 1 CIB to move 
on Agira with one battalion up and 
the full weight of the Royal Canadian 
Artillery (RCA) in support; 231 MB 
would attack simultaneously from 
the south.8
 T h e  4 8 t h  H i g h l a n d e r s  o f 
Canada (Highlanders) marched 
north from Assoro on 22-23 July to 
the intersection of Highways 121 
and 117 east of Leonforte. They 
unknowingly crossed the front of 
a German force lying to the south 
and several hours of intense combat 
ensued as the Highlanders pulled 
back, reorganized, and overpowered 
the enemy.9 The melee forced the 
postponement of the main advance 
until 24 July although 231 MB 
captured Points 533 and 482 astride 
the road leading north to Agira.10 The 
British patiently laid low and units 
from 3 CIB patrolled to their south. 
 By late afternoon 23 July the 
WNSR had destroyed German 
observation posts and machine gun 
nests, taking two prisoners from the 
Hermann Göring Division. Later 
the WNSR described suspicious 
movement to their front, confirmed at 
1923 hours by the Royal 22e Régiment 
who “reported guns and motorized 
transport going north” toward the 
highway.11 As 3 CIB monitored the 
movement of Axis troops, 1 CIB 
readied to attack Agira from the west. 
 The RCA, along with British 
regiments and air support, would 
neutralize predetermined targets 
between Nissoria and Agira. Five 
field and two medium regiments 
were ready to lay down shells while 
a squadron of tanks from 12th 
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Canadian Armoured Regiment (Three 
Rivers) would add mobile firepower. 
The Royal Canadian Army Service 
Corps reported that 43 trucks were 
driving 25-pounder ammunition 
to the front for nearly 22 hours a 
day, which gives some indication 
of the intensity of the fire support 
planned.12 These preparations have 
been well documented by historians 
but the composition of enemy 
forces has received a less thorough 
examination.  
 Existing histories name 2nd 
Battalion 104th Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment as the key enemy on the 
Agira battlefield, with 1st Battalion 
15th Panzer Grenadier Regiment 
defending the town itself.13 However, 
intelligence showed significant 
numbers of the 104th Regiment’s 
1st and 3rd Battalions, those who 
had barely escaped Leonforte, were 
present too. By 23 July 3rd Battalion 
33rd Italian Infantry Regiment 
was in the area along with 2nd 
Battalion 34th Regiment whom the 
Dorsets had already encountered. 
In addition to the many terrifying 
88s the Germans had on hand, 
the Italian 28th Artillery Regiment 
brought 75 mm guns and 20 mm 
anti-aircraft guns to bear, along with 
several detachments from mortar 
and anti-tank battalions.14 The main 
defence nucleus was much greater 
than previously acknowledged 
and this, along with the area’s 
harsh terrain, gave the enemy the 
advantage of concentrating his forces 
to maximum effect throughout the 
battle. Lieutenant-Colonel Ralph 
Crowe’s Royal Canadian Regiment 
(RCR) soon realized this when they 
led 1 CIB toward Agira on 24 July. 
 The RCR was hardened after 
two weeks of Sicilian combat and, 
as evidenced by the battalion’s war 
diary, was confident in the divisional 
plan:
The feature [Agira] is deemed so 
important to gain that the Battalion, 
which is leading the Brigade will 
be supported by the complete 
Divisional Artillery, plus ninety 
bombers, plus more than a hundred 
fighter-bombers in close support. 
It is a set piece attack, with a timed 
artillery program, report lines, bells, 
train whistles and all the trimmings. 
The start line is three miles West of 
Nissoria…Reports have been fairly 
vague as to enemy dispositions, but 
it is felt that the support will be so 
overwhelming that resistance before 
Agira will be slight.15 
 At  1500 hours  on 24  July 
Canadian and British guns targeted 
the ground between Leonforte and 
Agira. “C” and “D” Companies of 
the RCR marched through Nissoria 
behind a creeping smoke barrage. 
Battalion headquarters reported 
little resistance as the Saskatoon 
Light Infantry (SLI) “provided some 
excellent fire support during the 
move through town.”16 However, at 
1615 hours the RCR received a hostile 
reaction as they left the relative 
shelter of the town. The enemy was 
dug in on a ridge code-named “Lion” 
that crossed Highway 121 a half mile 
to the east. 
 It is important here to consider 
existing interpretations of this battle 
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Top right: Italian wagons sit abandoned 
by the side of a Sicilian road.
Bottom right: A Sicilian shepherd guides 
his flock of goats past a knocked out 
German tank.
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and the perception that 1 CIB failed. 
Historian and veteran of the battle 
Kim Beattie suggested that “Lion” 
was the brigade’s “most bitter and 
fruitless fight in Sicily.”17 The fighting 
was difficult but the efforts were 
hardly fruitless. As John Strawson 
indicated in The Italian Campaign, 
“grinding down the Axis strength” 
was the “proper strategic concept” 
used by the Allies in 1943.18 It was 
accomplished here with devastating 
results.  
 Sherman tanks from the Three 
Rivers supported the RCR’s “C” 
Company near the edge of town. 
Rugged terrain made the tanks road 
bound and further advance proved 
impossible on the well-registered 
route; one Sherman was hit seven 
times in succession. Undaunted, the 
Canadian tankers returned accurate 
fire and knocked out a trio of Mark 
III tanks, destroyed three heavy 
guns and eliminated scores of Axis 
soldiers.19 The infantry continued to 
fight ahead.  
 Captain C.H. Lithgow led “D” 
Company of the RCR through a gully 
behind Nissoria and up the ridge 
toward a red casa 50 yards north 
of Highway 121. To the southeast 
“C” Company exchanged fire with 
the enemy. Confusion reigned as 
communications failed because the 
“18 sets were out of range” and 
malfunctioning in the hilly country.20 
The assault disintegrated into 
isolated skirmishes and Lieutenant-
Colonel Crowe sent “A” and “B” 
Companies on a deep right flanking 
manoeuvre at 1700 hours, which 
actually brought them to the second 
enemy-held ridge (“Tiger”) one mile 
further east. “C” Company escaped 
the gauntlet of mortar fire at “Lion” 
and crept southeast to join “A” and 
“B” Companies.21 Attempting to 
find the scattered battalion, Crowe 
and his tactical headquarters party 
clambered atop “Lion” but were cut 
down by German machine guns. 
Most were wounded, while Crowe 
was killed.  
 Covered by accurate mortar 
fire, a company of Grenadiers 
counterattacked Captain Lithgow’s 
“D” Company at the red casa, forcing 
their withdrawal back to Nissoria. 
With the remaining elements of 
“A” Company they reorganized 
and tried attacking further north 
of the road but “the strength of the 
enemy position was unmistakable.”22 
Unable to contact the better part of 
the RCR and with darkness having 
fallen, Major-General Simonds 
ordered the offensive maintained. 
The Hastings and Prince Edward 
Regiment (Hastings) attacked later 
that night.  
 As the RCR fought, a pair of 
companies from the Hampshire 
Regiment of 231 MB occupied the 
Campanelli feature north of Highway 
121, cutting the roads from Agira 
that led north to Troina and east to 
Regalbuto. The rest of the battalion 
lay in the hills to the southeast.23 If 1 
CIB did not reach Agira before first 
light the British would be forced to 
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withdraw from their position because 
it was commanded by the town itself. 
 The Hastings crept through 
Nissoria and onto the front just before 
midnight 24-25 July. “B” Company 
led the battalion up “Lion” and 
accidentally stumbled into enemy 
positions but the men acted quickly 
by decimating forward machine gun 
posts, “killing a number of Germans 
and capturing others.” The Hastings 
persisted as Axis artillery and mortars 
screamed down for hours, but at 
0540 hours 1 CIB radioed divisional 
headquarters to report: “We are on 
ridge east of first town unable to get 
any further.”24  
 Twenty minutes later 231 MB 
reaffirmed their hold on Campanelli 
near Agira.25 Moments later radio 
communications between Canadian 
units failed again as numerous 
machine guns stitched the Hastings 
and three German tanks entered the 
fray. The second-in-command, Major 
A.A. Kennedy, raced to the rear to 
request immediate artillery support 
but the now-wounded commander, 
Major John Tweedsmuir, ordered 
a withdrawal as daylight revealed 
his men. Behind Agira “A” and “B” 
Companies of the Hampshires hid 
amongst the scrub and brush on the 
Campanelli feature as the rest of the 
battalion retired south.
 The enemy retained his grip on 
the hills past Nissoria but his strength 
was being rapidly depleted. Many 
historians highlight the casualties 
suffered by the Hastings (five officers 
and 75 other ranks) as apparent 
justification to describe the attack 
as abortive. Yet they neglect the 
Hastings’ war diary assessment that 
“casualties to the enemy were greater 
than those sustained by ourselves, 
which considering that they were in 
a commanding position, speaks well 
for the determination and coolness of 
our own troops.”26 Interestingly, the 
attack seems to have also created a 
situation where the RCR, still isolated 
near the front, could inflict casualties 
on the enemy. 
 After skirting their units past 
“Lion” on the evening of 24 July, 
Captains Galloway, Hodson and 
Liddell of the RCR determined 
t h a t  “ h a v i n g  a b s o l u t e l y  n o 
c o m m u n i c a t i o n ”  w i t h  t h e i r 
commander or artillery they would 
hold defensive positions for the 
night.27 Historian William McAndrew 
laments that “ironically, the only 
element lacking for a clear victory 
was a clear mission for the three 
companies behind the Germans.” 
There was a good reason for this 
state of affairs. “[T]he efficiency of a 
command system is defined by the 
rapidity of the flow of information,” 
and in this situation communications 
were crippled.28 Instead, the RCR 
took advantage of an opportunity. 
 As the Hastings renewed pressure 
at “Lion” enemy reinforcements 
moved west from Agira. Three 
trucks carrying Grenadiers drove 
past the RCR on “Tiger” and No.13 
Platoon of “C” Company opened 
fire, killing most of the passengers. 
Two more trucks soon met the 
same fate. Although enemy tanks 
eventually forced their withdrawal, 
it seems likely the platoon caused 
more damage to the enemy than 
the 47 casualties taken by the whole 
battalion during the battle. Daniel 
Dancocks claims when no one 
knew what happened to the RCR 
by evening it was clear their “attack 
had not succeeded.” However, 
No.13 Platoon’s achievement proved 
otherwise.29
 The  Hast ings ’  a t tack  a lso 
garnered valuable intelligence. 
Division confirmed at 0853 hours 
25 July that two prisoners captured 
during the assault belonged to the 
German 2nd Light Anti-Aircraft 
Battalion, elements of which were 
dug in on “Lion.” According to later 
intelligence summaries, two platoons 
of this battalion were operating in the 
vicinity of Nissoria; one with its 20 
mm cannons, the other as infantry.30 
Axis desperation was becoming clear. 
 With the delays at “Lion,” 
two companies of the Hampshires 
remained on the Campanelli feature 
near Agira at dawn on 25 July. Though 
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Soldiers of the Princess Patricia’s 
Canadian Light Infantry pass a Sherman 
tank of the Three Rivers Regiment in 
Sicily, 19 July 1943.
Barry - Agira.indd   45 6/14/2010   2:50:15 PM
5
: Beyond the Consensus 1st Canadian Infantry Division at Agira, Sicily 24-28 July 1943
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2010
46
initially unnoticed, enemy patrols 
soon approached their positions and 
by mid-afternoon had launched a 
fierce counterattack supported by 
artillery. The British “held on among 
the vines and prickly pears until 
withdrawn on the evening of the 
25th.”31 Hours later they stole across 
Highway 121 and regained positions 
covering the north and east roads 
from Agira. To the west the Canadian 
assault continued. 
 The  Canadian  a t tack  was 
renewed by Lieutenant-Colonel Ian 
Johnston’s 48th Highlanders. In the 
late morning of 25 July daring patrols 
probed the highest, northernmost 
part of “Lion” known as Monte di 
Nissoria. A patrol led by Captain 
Ian Wallace blasted a German party 
ensconced behind a boulder-strewn 
ridge with automatic and rifle fire, 
“killing four and returning with 
valuable information.” German 
tanks were dug in on the heights and 
more men of 2nd Light Anti-Aircraft 
Battalion were present.32 
 A s  t h e  4 8 t h  H i g h l a n d e r s 
patrolled, the RCR was located but 
recalled to Nissoria by 1100 hours to 
avoid suffering casualties from their 
own artillery in the coming attack. 
Some have argued that the RCR 
position should have been reinforced 
but with some consideration this 
idea rings hollow. Support weapons 
could not be employed due to the 
terrain and radio blackout. Also, the 
men were worn out after a long day 
of fighting and the position grew 
untenable once a German force 
returned. As dawn broke on 25 July, 
the enemy “were able to overlook 
[the RCR] position and inflict some 
casualties with mortar and machine 
gun fire.” As historian Mark Zuehlke 
cautions, “you can only ask so much 
of even the best soldiers.”33 
 At 1800 hours on 25 July the 
48th Highlanders set off for Monte 
di Nissoria as the SLI hit the position 
with thunderous fire from their 4.2-
inch heavy mortars. The support 
group “evidently did a good job…
and inflicted a great number of 
casualties” on the defenders.34 While 
the Highlanders’ “A” Company 
provided covering fire Major Don 
Banton’s “D” Company trailed an 
artillery barrage toward the rocky 
shelf. If Banton reached the objective 
Captain Bob Lyon’s “B” Company 
would tackle a less elevated part 
of the ridge to the right.  The 
companies would then overlook 
the enemy stronghold near the red 
casa.35 Moving through heavy fire 
“D” Company reached the crest by 
scaling numerous terraces shrouded 
in tangled vegetation. Suddenly, 
enfilading machine gun fire erupted 
to their left. 
 “B” Company moved to overrun 
the lethal machine guns but enemy 
mortars bracketed the exposed 
men. Four Mark IV tanks opened 
up on the Canadians and steep 
terrain prevented the Three Rivers 
from answering effectively. The 1st 
Canadian Anti-Tank Regiment’s 
war diary reported that the ground 
beyond Nissoria was “poor country 
for anti-tank guns except defensively” 
and Axis units took full advantage.36 
Lieutenant-Colonel Johnston’s link 
to 1 CIB was out, as was the artillery 
forward observation officer’s radio 
connection with his 25-pounders. 
Incredibly, some 48th Highlanders 
still reached their objective. 
 While “B” and “D” Companies 
continued to struggle near the crest 
of Monte di Nissoria, “C” Company 
crashed into enemy positions closer 
to the highway. Attacking right of the 
earlier thrust, Captain Ian Wallace 
intended on holding the ground near 
the red casa. The company set out at 
2300 hours on a series of meandering 
goat paths. Their arrival atop “Lion” 
was welcomed by the muzzles of 
two Mark IV tanks which forced the 
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The main road through Nissoria, Highway 
121, shows the effects of hard fighting 
following the capture of the town.
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men back below the crest. However, 
brigade received a brief report that 
men were on the objective “but 
having a very hard time.”37 Perhaps 
overestimating the size of Wallace’s 
contingent, the enemy withdrew 
before dawn allowing “C” Company 
to dig in; they would only stay briefly. 
 By 0700 hours 25 July the 48th 
Highlanders were winding their 
way back to Nissoria. Historian 
Hugh Pond states that “neither 
Brigade nor Divisional headquarters 
would believe [“C” Company],” 
and this reflects the Highlanders’ 
regimental history that concluded 
brigade “would not put credence 
in the report that the area of major 
resistance around Nissoria was 
clear.”38 The decision to pull back 
was likely a result of the situation 
along the Highlanders’ entire front, 
and the enemy to the north remained 
resolute.
 With Monte di Nissoria protected 
by German tanks and Axis guns, 
which dominated most of “Lion,” 
the Canadians below were stalked by 
the enemy and forced to withdraw. 
“C” Company did the same lest 
they remain near the casa with 
exposed flanks and an alert enemy 
overlooking them.39 East of Agira the 
Hampshires withdrew to positions 
south of Highway 121. 
 The opening phase of  the 
battle for Agira is a complex and 
misunderstood event. Historians are 
critical of 1 CIB’s role and often refer 
to this part of the assault as a defeat. 
Dominick Graham, Major-General 
Simonds’ biographer, scoffed that it 
was a classic example of committing 
troops piecemeal, while Kim Beattie 
suggested that “Nissoria had beaten 
each of the three battalions in turn.” 
Nicholson dubbed the attack a 
“reverse” and Mark Zuehlke labels 
the first attempt to seize Agira an 
“abject failure.”40 To date, historians 
do not appreciate the formation’s role 
in the battle, possibly because they 
fail to see the larger context of this 
effort. 
 Some have suggested that 
Brigadier Graham’s three assaults 
were identical. Pond charges that 
Graham reinforced failure with 
“head-on war, using bludgeons; no 
finesse.”41 However, 1 CIB actually 
probed several areas of the front 
because enemy strength and locations 
were unknown. The Hastings 
attacked south of Highway 121 after 
“D” Company from the RCR (the 
only unit to return by that time) was 
checked along the northern edge 
of the highway. The Highlanders 
moved well north and, when blocked 
on the left flank, “C” Company 
advanced closer to the highway. 
Together these efforts eased the way 
for 2nd Canadian Infantry Brigade (2 
CIB). 
 The reconnaissance-in-force 
began to reveal that the area west of 
Agira was the most heavily defended 
ground the Canadians would take 
in Sicily. Although 1 CIB could 
not hold this ground, they made 
vital contributions to the larger 
battle by destroying enemy men and 
equipment and eroding morale. They 
damaged 2nd Battalion 104th Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment so badly that 1st 
Battalion and two companies from 
6th Italian Infantry Regiment (28th 
Aosta Division) were rushed south 
from Nicosia on 26 July.42 Axis forces 
were utterly ravaged and the enemy 
would be given no quarter. 
 Major-General Simonds ordered 
Brigadier Chris Vokes’ 2 CIB to 
relieve 1 CIB and renew the attack. 
Infantry and supporting arms would 
be deployed in greater strength, 
A Canadian 25-pounder near Nissoria fires at 
enemy targets on the night of 27 July 1943.
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along with a more powerful and 
concentrated barrage that doubled 
the number of shells previously 
fired.43 Brigade Major P.R. Bingham 
stressed that “success in the attack, 
depends on aggressive action, with 
a very quick follow-up, both of 
our own supporting fire and the 
retreating enemy.” He added it was 
essential to “find the Hun, hit him 
and keep hitting him.”44 The enemy 
could now be located more easily and 
hit due to the work of 1 CIB. 
 On the afternoon of 26 July 
Brigadier Graham recounted his 
brigade’s experience beyond Nissoria 
to Brigadier Vokes. The latest 
information from the Highlanders 
indicated that strong hostile positions 
were further east than originally 
thought. Graham added that artillery 
concentrations did not shake the 
defenders off the reverse slope 
of Monte di Nissoria and enemy 
machine gun posts had moved 
regularly. The brigadier supported 
Colonel Ian Johnston’s suggestion 
that a thrust down the right flank of 
the battlefield where Highway 121 
cut across the ridge should provide 
the best venue for success.45 Though 
valuable, this information could not 
prevent the enemy from reinforcing 
his lines, nor could it ensure Canadian 
radios would work.  
 As the 48th Highlanders returned 
from the front on the morning of 25 
July 30,000 shells were already being 
trucked to British and Canadian 
guns. The war diary of the 3rd Field 
Regiment, RCA noted: “At 1300 
hours [26 July] 2 Canadian Infantry 
Brigade relieved 1 Canadian Infantry 
Brigade in and around Nissoria, and 
plans were made for a big attack 
to start at 2000 hours. Orders were 
received by this regiment to dump 
400 rounds per gun in preparation 
for the biggest barrage yet attempted 
by Divisional Artillery.” Targets were 
pre-selected before but now “the 
artillery plan was for two minutes 
intense fire on the start line west of 
Nissoria, followed by a fifteen minute 
concentration, followed in turn by 
sixteen 100 yard lifts at three minute 
intervals.” The barrage would then 
stop for 20 minutes, allowing the 
second wave of the Princess Patricia’s 
Canadian Light Infantry (PPCLI) to 
pass “Lion” and advance with the 
next phase of the fire plan at 2130 
hours. Shelling would resume as 12 
100 yard lifts rumbled east to the 
reverse slope of “Tiger.”46 The fire 
plan was impressive but success 
depended on the infantry.  
 The PPCLI were ordered to 
secure a firm base extending 2,300 
yards past Nissoria by capturing 
“Lion” then moving onto “Tiger.” 
The Seaforth Highlanders of Canada 
(Seaforths) would then take the 
“Grizzly” line of defence closest to 
Agira. Support was provided by 
the 90th Anti-Tank Battery, 54th 
Light Anti-Aircraft Battery, and “C” 
Squadron of the Three Rivers.47 As the 
two battalions fought, the brigade’s 
third unit was tasked with covering 
the left flank. 
 Since 24 July the Loyal Edmonton 
Regiment (Loyal Eddies) was actively 
patrolling north of Nissoria between 
Highway 117 to the west and the 
Nicosia-Agira roadway to the east. As 
the US Seventh Army swung parallel 
with 1 CID to attack Nicosia, “active 
liaison was carried out between the 
two forces” and a number of enemy 
targets were engaged by the artillery. 
On 26 July, for example, ten enemy 
vehicles and a tank were destroyed 
on the Nicosia-Agira road and 
Canadian guns forced the surrender 
of 90 Italians whom American forces 
corralled.48 Meanwhile, as 2 CIB 
fought past Nissoria, 231 MB cut 
Highway 121 east of Agira again. 
 As thousands of shells fell on 
enemy lines on the evening of 26 July, 
the Hampshires closed around Agira. 
They gained Point 583 southeast of 
town and the Campanelli feature to 
the north. Unfortunately they lost 
their hold at dawn and informed the 
Seaforths that they “had been thrown 
back off the road on the east side of 
town.”49 The enemy still enjoyed free 
movement about town though he 
scarcely clung to the ridges further 
west. 
 Before the PPCLI moved out 
devastating artillery fire cut a mile-
wide path through the battlefield. 
The SLI joined the cacophony of the 
night by hemming “Lion” with their 
Vickers machine guns and blanketing 
the area with high explosive from 
their 4.2-inch heavy mortars. At 
2017 hours 26 July “C” and “D” 
Companies attacked. Once through 
Padre Stewart East of the 48th 
Highlanders pauses by the side of the 
road near Regalbuto to have a word with 
some of his men.
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Nissoria’s streets “D” Company was 
hit by three machine guns along the 
highway. By 2040 hours one machine 
gun was silenced and Nos.17 and 18 
Platoons reached the ridge.50 
 The barrage was “reported by 
the infantry to be perfect” and in 
front of “C” Company the claim was 
well supported. On the southern 
end of “Lion” “the enemy were so 
demoralized by the shelling” that 
15 soldiers surrendered instantly 
and others were soon persuaded 
by bayonet. Additionally, nine 
light machine guns were found 
abandoned.51 Proper consolidation 
of the ridge proved taxing though. 
 At 2130 hours “C” and “D” 
Companies requested armoured 
support as enemy guns tested their 
flank. The road beyond Nissoria was 
not secured and the Shermans moved 
forward with great difficulty. The 
PPCLI’s anti-tank platoon, along with 
some divisional 17-pounders, was 
later moved to the ridge although 
sighting the guns in the dark was 
nearly impossible. As mortars and 
machine guns harassed them “D” 
Company dug in 300 yards from the 
enemy. For “C” Company the onset 
of night led to “a spirited grenade and 
tommy-gun fight.”52 
 According to plan the artillery 
paused but “A” and “B” Companies 
became lost in the dark and could 
not close quickly. Undaunted, “B” 
Company moved along the southern 
flank of the highway within 400 
yards of “Tiger” at 2200 hours. Ten 
minutes later they gained another 100 
yards and radioed that their assault 
was “proceeding well,” evidently 
helped by the artillery. A captured 
German officer proclaimed that 
during service in Poland, France, 
Russia and North Africa “he had 
never experienced a barrage like 
that.” Axis units on “Tiger” suffered 
40 percent casualties and survivors 
were still groggy after the barrage 
ceased. Prisoners indicated the state 
of 1st and 2nd Battalions 104th Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment was growing 
perilous. Combat engineers from the 
476th Regiment and infantry from 
1st Battalion 15th Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment were thrown into the line, 
along with members of 93rd Italian 
and 1st Sicilian Infantry Regiments.53 
These forces continued to resist. 
 As the PPCLI’s “C” and “D” 
Companies hunted for concealed 
machine guns around “Lion” trouble 
emerged to their rear. A company of 
grenadiers and a number of Italians 
attacked from Monte di Nissoria, 
attempting to unseat the PPCLI. 
With a high percentage of automatic 
weapons the enemy harassed the rear 
and flank of “D” Company as Italian 
artillery officers called down shells.54 
The PPCLI checked the bitter attack 
and cleared the ridge, allowing Three 
Rivers’ tanks to take up positions 
north of Highway 121 on the reverse 
slope of “Lion.” From here the 
armour took “intense hostile machine 
gun fire” while they provided vital 
support to the infantry in the valley 
below. Some optimistic radio reports 
filtered back but the situation at the 
front remained uncertain.
 Brigadier Chris Vokes and his 
staff were unsure of the PPCLI’s 
exact status on either ridge but 
the Seaforths were ready. Eager to 
maintain momentum Vokes “decided 
to commit the second battalion for 
the exploitation task in the hope that 
aggressive action would clear up the 
situation in the PPCLI’s area.”55 Early 
on 27 July Lieutenant-Colonel Bert 
Hoffmeister’s Seaforths moved out, 
quickly coming upon “C” and “D” 
Companies of the PPCLI fighting 
on “Lion.” The Seaforths moved 
past at 0340 hours, pushed through 
heavy machine gun fire and closed 
on “Tiger” one hour later.56 When 
they reached the second ridge “A” 
Company was fiercely engaged by 
infantry, tanks and heavy guns.
 With dawn breaking on 27 July 
the Seaforth’s “A” Company was 
pinned down near the southern 
edge the highway, unable to destroy 
a trio of German tanks. They were 
joined on their right flank by “B” 
Company and anti-tank guns were 
soon wrestled up to eliminate the 
armoured threat. At 0600 hours the 
Seaforths reported they were on 
“Tiger” and in contact with the PPCLI 
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but all units were progressing slowly 
due to heavy machine gun fire. Still, 
the battalions were grinding down 
the enemy.  
 At  sunrise  on 27 July the 
effectiveness of the assault became 
sharply apparent. Between “Lion” 
and “Tiger” enemy dead lay scattered 
amongst  discarded weapons , 
ammunition belts and unopened 
rations. Axis armour and vehicles, 
smashed by artillery, were scattered 
like coals from a fire. When Canadian 
soldiers moved forward they passed 
a Mark IV tank with “the turret 
blown right off and all the rubber 
burnt off the tracks and bogies.”57 
Groups of prisoners were escorted 
back to Nissoria, further confirming 
the success of the advance.
 Brigadier Vokes did all he could 
to direct the attack although broken 
communications made battlefield 
management challenging. Messages 
were relayed to the Seaforths by “A” 
and “B” Companies of the PPCLI. At 
0715 hours Vokes boomed over the 
radio: “Tell the Seaforth of Canada 
to get cracking and you form a firm 
base behind him.”58 With help from 
armour and artillery the battalions 
did exactly that. The Three Rivers’ 
tanks, now positioned between 
“Lion” and “Tiger,” sat quietly at 
dawn then stealthily destroyed 
“enemy anti-tank guns and machine 
guns as soon as they divulged their 
positions by firing.” Artillery was 
called down and the remains of 
Axis forces encamped on the ridge 
were ravaged.59 “Tiger” was firmly 
in Canadian hands by 1100 hours 27 
July. 
 The Seaforths now benefited from 
an excellent view of “Grizzly,” the 
final line of resistance before Agira. 
Fire from small arms and the Vickers 
machine guns of the SLI slashed 
through the valley east of “Tiger.” 
The Three Rivers quickly weighed in 
and disabled four German tanks and 
a considerable number of vehicles.60 
The Seaforth’s artillery forward 
observation officer identified targets 
throughout the day and the very 
accurate fire scattered the enemy in 
the valley. Prisoners reported that 
1st Battalion 104th Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment was wiped out and 1st 
Battalion 15th Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment would fight to the last 
man.61 The Canadians maintained 
pressure across the front including 
the area north of Highway 121 where 
the Loyal Eddies were fighting.
 A platoon from the Loyal Eddies’ 
“D” Company cut the road leading 
north to Nicosia on the afternoon 
of 26 July. By the time “Tiger” was 
consolidated on 27 July this force 
had destroyed three tanks, four 
vehicles and a tank conveyor. Traffic 
on the road was so heavy that two 
platoons from “C” Company came to 
reinforce the position. Later, when the 
assault on “Grizzly” began, enemy 
movement on the road increased 
and the Loyal Eddies knocked out 
three more tanks at 1739 hours before 
another four joined the fray and 
forced a withdrawal.62 
 Most of the enemy west of 
Agira on 27 July were positioned 
atop two menacing features astride 
Highway 121. Monte Fronte, a box-
shaped plateau, 300 feet above the 
surrounding terrain and 900 yards in 
length, stretched south of the roadway 
creating a strong left flank for the 
Axis. To the north, Cemetery Hill and 
Monte Crapuzza commanded both 
the Nissoria and Nicosia roadways. 
Lieutenant-Colonel Hoffmeister 
sent “D” Company of the Seaforths 
against the wooded hills north of 
the highway while “A” Company 
departed for Monte Fronte.63 
 A heavy concentration of shells 
rocked “Grizzly” for 15 minutes 
while two platoons of Vickers 
machine guns and a platoon of 4.2-
inch mortars softened the enemy 
before the infantry advanced at 1415 
hours.64 South of the highway “A” 
Company met a wave of hostile fire 
but continued to press the attack. 
Two troops from the Three Rivers 
accompanied the infantry and caused 
The smoke in the distance marks targets being attacked on GRIZZLY by the Desert Air Force during the 
battle for Agira. This photo, taken from TIGER, shows the flat-topped Monte Fronte to the right; the heights 
of Agira to the right of centre; and the lower dome of Monte Crapuzza visible through the smoke to the left.
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“great havoc among enemy machine 
gun positions.”65 However, the 
enemy responded with a high rate 
of fire, thus necessitating a flanking 
manoeuvre by the Seaforths.
 Because of Monte Fronte’s 
precipitous western face Major Budge 
Bell-Irving directed “A” Company 
south. Terraced vineyards and 
orchards were traversed by several 
sunken tracks which “produced 
exce l lent  cover  and  a l lowed 
immediate and rapid progress.” 
No.8 Platoon closed to the base of the 
hill and held the enemy’s attention. 
Their shooting was so effective that 
several men gained the top of the 
cliff, destroyed a machine gun nest 
and took two prisoners.66 The feint 
held the enemy in check and at 1500 
hours the rest of “A” Company hiked 
southeast toward the rear of the 
position. 
 With complete tactical surprise 
“A” Company scaled the unguarded 
southern end of “Grizzly.” After 
establishing a foothold along a 
rocky ridge that crossed the plateau 
diagonally, and around a casa that 
provided protective cover, Bell-Irving 
reported at 1547 hours that his men 
were directly overlooking the enemy. 
At 1558 hours Canadian guns roared 
into action and targeted the enemy at 
the northern end of the plateau for 30 
minutes. At 1722 hours the Seaforths 
reorganized on “Grizzly” and waited 
for reinforcements while resisting 
enemy attacks.67 Dusk brought relief 
from enemy machine gun fire but 
radio communications broke and “A” 
Company was left isolated. 
 In response to “A” Company’s last 
call for reinforcements Lieutenant-
Colonel Hoffmeister ordered “B” and 
“C” Companies of the Seaforths to 
attack. At 1800 hours they threaded 
through orchards and vineyards on 
universal carriers. As the units went 
forward Hoffmeister ordered the 
withdrawal of “D” Company to the 
north. Meanwhile, 1 CID reported 
that 100 of the enemy were dead and 
200 wounded; 100 Italians and 40 
Germans were captured.68  
 When “D” Company’s attack 
struggled below the enemy infested 
hills commanding Highway 121 
from the north, Hoffmeister knew 
not to stretch his battalion thin. 
“The situation became confused, 
but it was clear” that the Seaforths 
could not take all of “Grizzly” alone. 
Accordingly, the Loyal Eddies’ “A,” 
“B” and “D” Companies (minus one 
platoon) passed through Seaforth 
positions near the northern end of 
“Grizzly” at 1900 hours.69 At 2050 
hours the hills surrounding the 
graveyard trembled from artillery 
fire before the Loyal Eddies moved 
out at 2100 hours.70 Shortly before, 
however, the enemy on Monte Fronte 
counterattacked the Seaforths.
 As “B” and “C” Companies of 
the Seaforths arrived on carriers from 
the west they were bracketed with 
mortars and forced to slip through 
the dark on foot toward the rocky 
crag. Enemy machine gun and mortar 
fire pinned “B” Company in the 
rolling terrain west of Monte Fronte 
at 2020 hours. No.15 Platoon of “C” 
Company returned fire from a small 
knoll southwest of “Grizzly,” hoping 
to cover the movement of No.14 
Platoon to their right.71 Machine gun 
fire and rough terrain slowed all 
advances; “A” Company remained 
isolated. 
 A t  m i d n i g h t  2 7 - 2 8  J u l y 
a counterattack probed the area 
around the casa on Monte Fronte 
held by “A” Company’s Nos.8 and 
9 Platoons. Mortar and machine gun 
fire came down over the Seaforths. 
“The company’s limited supply of 
ammunition permitted only restricted 
defensive fire, but the Hun quickly 
shut up and went to bed.”72 The battle 
along the Seaforth’s front ebbed but 
action in the Loyal Eddies’ sector 
exploded. 
 After attacking in two thrusts the 
Loyal Eddies became embroiled in 
fighting that continued relentlessly 
until dawn on 28 July. At the northern 
end of “Tiger,”  “A” Company 
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snatched the undefended Monte 
Crapuzza. To the south “B” and “D” 
Companies had difficulty clearing the 
cemetery as the enemy replied with 
mortars, heavy machine guns, rifle-
grenades and a wealth of small arms. 
Division later reported the capture 
of 20 mm anti-aircraft guns from 
the 28th Artillery Regiment which 
helped explain the intense fire. The 
Loyal Eddies braved the onslaught 
and some actually reached Agira’s 
streets by 0230 hours, but the salient 
was eventually pushed back and the 
battle for the cemetery continued 
unabated.73 
 By sunrise on 28 July the contest 
on the steep hills degenerated into 
savage hand to hand fighting. “It was 
not until the enemy were engaged 
with the bayonet,” says the Loyal 
Eddies’ war diary, “that the situation 
began to clarify itself.” While “A” 
Company shot into the enemy flank 
“B” and “D” Companies surged 
forward between 0530 and 0600 
hours.74 The defenders were routed 
and the few survivors disappeared 
over the hills. 
 Just before the Loyal Eddies’ 
final push, part of the Seaforths’ 
“A” Company on Monte Fronte was 
again hit by a strong mortar barrage, 
heavy machine gun fire and a volley 
of grenades at 0500 hours. Nos.8 and 
9 Platoons led by Lieutenant Harling 
displayed magnificent fortitude and 
fire discipline, eventually breaking 
the assault with their own hail of 
grenades. Having struggled through 
the night to reach them, Lieutenant 
McLean and No.14 Platoon of “C” 
Company arrived at 0545 hours, 
just as Harling’s counterattack took 
shape.75 Together they shattered the 
enemy’s tenuous hold on “Grizzly” 
within 15 minutes. Motorcycle 
dispatch riders and engineers from 
104th Panzer Grenadier Regiment’s 
headquarters were found fighting as 
regular infantry. A dozen prisoners 
from 1st Battalion 15th Panzer 
Grenadier Regiment were netted, 
including “a medical orderly loaded 
down with ammunition.”76 Such 
desperate measures would not stop 
the Canadian advance. 
 The rest of the Seaforth’s “C” 
and “B” Companies moved to hold 
Monte Fronte and the Loyal Eddies 
consolidated the cemetery. At 0850 
hours “Grizzly” was in Canadian 
hands and nearly all the enemy 
killed. Vokes’ men had collected 
over 215 prisoners since the evening 
of 26 July and it was probable that 
enemy wounded numbered in the 
hundreds. There were over 150 dead, 
even without figures from the Loyal 
Eddies’ sector.77 
 While the Canadians pressed 
the western edge of Agira, 231 MB 
again seized the Campanelli feature 
near town, cutting the roads north 
and east. In doing so the Devons’ 
“C” Company noted “more Germans 
were killed than were taken prisoner” 
and “D” Company of the Dorsets 
also achieved effective results. Their 
attack was launched so quickly 
that 80 Italians had no choice but to 
surrender.78 With the exits cut, 2 CIB 
was set to clear Agira. 
 B r i g a d i e r  V o k e s  q u i c k l y 
“planned an attack supported by all 
available Artillery, and Mortars in 
the Brigade.” At 1330 hours 28 July 
a forward observation officer from 
1st Field Regiment, RCA “who had 
entered the town by mistake came 
back and reported that he had seen no 
Germans.”79 Patrols from the PPCLI 
went forward to investigate and the 
claim appeared accurate. “A” and 
“B” Companies marched in without a 
barrage but were caught by machine 
guns after 300 yards. Resistance lasted 
until almost 1900 hours. The majority 
of the battalion was committed and 
when the situation was rectified the 
enemy had lost another 160 personnel 
killed, wounded and captured.80 The 
battle for Agira was over. 
 The struggle to pry the Axis 
from the mountain town was 
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Gunners of the 7th Battery, 2nd Field 
Regiment, Royal Canadian Artillery, 
firing their 25-pounder guns at German 
positions, Nissoria, Italy, 23-28 July 
1943.
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described by war correspondent 
Lionel Shapiro of the Montreal 
Gazette as “the most glittering victory 
of the Canadians in the Sicilian 
campaign.”81 The concentration 
of Axis units entrenched east of 
Nissoria necessitated the cooperation 
of infantry and armour, along with an 
intricate and voluminous fire-plan, 
described in the war diary of 3rd 
Field Regiment: 
The barrage opened at 2000 hours and 
was described as magnificent. The 
attack was a complete success and 
our infantry ended up in control of 
the high ground…Enemy prisoners 
captured after the attack stated that 
the barrage was so terrific and our 
infantry followed so closely behind 
that they had had no alternative but 
to lay down their arms. They were 
shaken and demoralized.82
 Fr iend and foe al ike paid 
additional tribute to the artillery in 
particular. Brigadier A.B. Matthews, 
commanding officer of 1 CID’s 
artillery, declared:
Recent employment of Field and 
Medium Artillery on a Divisional 
basis has brought forward many 
complimentary remarks for the 
“Gunners” from all quarters. I would 
like Commanding Officers to assure 
that all ranks RCA and RA know that 
their support has been timely and 
effective and is greatly appreciated 
by the infantry.83
A captured Italian major even 
proclaimed his amazement that 
25-pounders “wrought such damage 
and disaster” on his unit.84 The attack 
certainly left an impression on those 
involved, although its effect on 
historians has had a less desirable 
result. 
 Of 2 CIB’s part in the attack, 
McAndrew wrote: “Two of its 
battalions mounted a frontal assault, 
while a third moved wide.”85 The 
perception that 2 CIB conquered 
Agira with relative ease has created 
a misguided historical consensus 
which suggests one brigade failed 
and another succeeded. The account 
presented here, by contrast, suggests 
that one brigade built on the success 
of the other.
 Indeed the two brigades had 
similar experiences in important 
respects. During the whole period 
24-28 July, for example, soldiers of 
2 CIB and 1 CIB alike often fought 
localized engagements at a numerical 
disadvantage. At “Lion,” units from 
1 CIB contended with far more than 
2nd Battalion 104th Panzer Grenadier 
Regiment, and Mark Zuehlke notes 
how a reduced company of 40 Loyal 
Eddies overpowered 150 of the 
enemy on Cemetery Hill.86 Likewise, 
during each phase of the battle 
rugged terrain restricted movement 
and radio communications broke 
down. A single brigade was unlikely 
to overcome these challenges and 
reach Agira on its own, especially not 
as the enemy poured reinforcements 
into the front. Through a continuous 
and collective effort, however, victory 
was guaranteed. 
 The Canadian triumph at Agira, 
as facts have exhibited, really was 
a tactical success. It also met the 
strategic goals of the Allies by 
destroying significant Axis military 
resources. Operationally, the fall of 
Agira set in motion an unstoppable 
advance against the western flank 
of enemy defences surrounding the 
Catania Plains. Brigadier Howard 
Graham stated that the fight for this 
town was one of the “key battles 
in the task of relieving the British 
forces, who had been attempting to 
drive north along the eastern coast of 
Sicily to Catania.”87 It is appropriate 
to quote the commander of 1 CIB as 
his formation truly played an integral 
role in capturing Agira. 
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